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Introduction
The dramatic rise in security threats to global commercial interests over the last decade and efforts to curb those threats has brought increased legal debate to the forefront of academic, state, and media attention. As market globalization continues to link the fates of world economies, the U.S. and the international community have devoted exponentially greater resources to understanding and combating maritime piracy and cyber exploitation. Focused U.N. resolutions, widespread deployment of multi-national naval forces, improved reporting processes, and standardized defensive practices have made dramatic progress in reducing the overall incident frequency of maritime pirate attacks. 2 However, this has come at considerable monetary cost to the U.S. and its international partners, as well as to the shipping industry itself, and ability to sustain this effort in light of strained economies and diminishing national resources is uncertain. Additionally, terrorist links to maritime piracy have been made in recent years, further heightening the international community's need to continue fighting these threats effectively and efficiently. As terrorists and criminals increasingly pool resources for common gain, it is even more essential to take appropriate action. 3 Meanwhile, there is a growing recognition of the cyber domain as a new frontier in which conflict resembles earlier ages of warfare and in which corporate and intellectual piracy have considerable effects on national security and the U.S. economy.
Retired General Michael Hayden, former Director of both the National Security and 2 Central Intelligence Agencies, recently compared America's entry into the cyberspace domain to European colonization of the Western Hemisphere, drawing stark comparisons between cyber law development and maritime law development. 4 As the U.S. looks for methods to deal with these threats, perhaps policymakers should look back through history to legal categories with which the framers of the Constitution were familiar. this strategy research paper first emphasizes the general context of extraterritorial security threats to U.S. interests resulting from global piracy and cyber exploitation.
Next, it examines the history, legality, and differentiation between privateering and
Letters of marque and reprisal within the development of U.S. and international law. It then reviews the current state of maritime piracy and cyber exploitation. Finally, it proposes a conceptual framework for resurrecting a letter of marque and reprisal system as a means of addressing contemporary security threats within an environment of constrained military budgets and rebalanced national focus.
General Context
For the better part of human history, the primary method for dealing with maritime pirates was individual avoidance and self-defense. Over time, great powers began to address this extraterritorial threat to state sovereignty in a variety of ways and with varying degrees of success. The development of state navies, in addition to their significance for power projection and national expansion, was largely motivated by the need to protect national maritime trade from mercantile competitors and pirates. From the 13th to the 19th centuries, governments even used state-sponsored privateering as a force multiplier to engage their enemies and to fight piracy itself. By the mid-19th century, a growing body of international law also developed to address the problem.
Under the influence of European colonialism and imperialism, the high seas became a cauldron for international rivalry, and the convergence of national expansion and oceanic trade led to the Western world's development of modern international law to regulate competition on the high seas. 6 In the 21 st century, the international community continues to face the extraterritorial threat of maritime piracy, as well as exploitation in a new domain --cyberspace. While often considered threats of separate natures, there are conceptual parallels between maritime piracy and cyber exploitation that find commonality in history 4 and economics. Unfortunately, bringing maritime pirates and cyber criminals to justice has proven difficult under current norms of international law, and strategies focused on deterrence and prosecution have largely failed. Piracy continues to flourish as financial incentives often outweigh inherent risks. As the Global War on Terrorism has proven, due process and previously established norms of international law sometimes take a back seat to necessity when presently perceived threats are involved. As we move increasingly into a world where cyber threats rival traditional physical threats, there are legal links worth exploring that have precedence in history. However, we must first review the story of maritime privateering and letters of marque and reprisal, and examine their impact on the development of international law.
Letters of Marque and Reprisal
Although law has developed over the last 200 years to address differences between the concepts of piracy, privateering, marque, and reprisal, history is storied with debate over their interpretation. While the accepted definition of maritime piracy according to Article 101 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is more lengthy and complex, in the historical sense, piracy was generally accepted by the common law of nations as "robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority, done animo furandi, in the spirit and intention of universal hostility." Privateering, on the other hand, was "the practice of arming privately owned merchant ships for the purpose of attacking enemy trading ships" in time of war. 8 While piracy was universally established as an international crime, the concept of privateering in a historical setting was sanctioned by sovereign states for assistance in the prosecution of declared war, and therefore considered a legitimate form of war-like activity conducted by non-state actors.
Conversely, the origin of the "letter of marque and reprisal" stems from its use in time of peace. Although often synonymous with privateering because they were typically issued to privateers, the concept of such letters is historically distinct from privateering. 9 The traditional law of marque allowed a private citizen to cross borders, while reprisal referred to the act of seeking restitution for a perceived slight. 10 Thus letters of marque and reprisal licensed private citizens of one state to take recompense from the citizens of another for a legally recognized grievance.
Original History
In 1243, King Henry III of England became the first sovereign to formally use privateers, commissioning them to "annoy [his] enemies by sea or by land." 11 Profitdriven, these early privateers sought financial gain through involvement in their King's wars. 12 Fifty-two years later, in 1295, the first "letter of mark" was issued by the Lieutenant of King Edward I to secure reprisal for an English citizen who had been defaulted of his ship and property by the King of Portugal. 13 It is important to note that at this time, England was not at war with Portugal, nor did the two nations go to war due to the letter's issuance. By the 16th Century, such use of letters of marque and reprisal by European sovereigns had become widespread, and constituted a respectable enterprise in which profit and patriotism were combined as "a measure short of war that did not breach international peace." 14 Eventually the distinction between commissions for privateers during war and letters of marque issued for reprisal during times of peace became blurred. Privateers armed with a letter of marque from a sovereign nation gained authorization to attack shipping in the name of that sovereign in both peace and war, without being considered a true pirate. 29 Although the U.S. was invited to join the declaration, it specifically refrained, reserving for itself the right to utilize privateering to augment its small navy in order to protect its vast shorelines. 30 
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Comparative jurist and historian Sir Henry Sumner Maine argued in 1888 that one of the chief reasons that the U.S. supported privateering was not only due to its success in preserving the young republic in its early years, but also because it preferred such methods to maintaining standing military forces. 31 Regardless, during the War of 1812, some 500 American vessels were lost to British action while nearly three times as many British vessels were taken by American privateers alone. 32 It was viewed at the time that one of the chief European (and particularly, British) motivations for the Declaration of Paris was to specifically prevent the United States of America, a growing and resource-rich nation with vast shorelines and only meager naval forces, from using privateers in any future engagement. 33 Recognizing the underlying motivations of the European powers, but not wanting to appear as impeding the cause of liberal maritime law, Secretary of State William Marcy counter-proposed that the treaty be amended to include all capture of non-contraband private property at sea, to include that taken by national warships. 34 This was a bold move, as had the European powers accepted the Marcy Amendment, the U.S. would have been extremely vulnerable to any future blockade by the immense navies of Great Britain or France, without any means to retaliate. 35 They did not, however, and the U.S. retracted its offer shortly thereafter.
The Declaration of Paris specifically stated that it would not apply to those countries who chose not to sign on, allowing them to continue using privateers, but also allowing other countries to commission and recognize privateers against them.
Ironically, when the American Civil War broke out, the U.S. decision not to accede to the The Declaration of Paris is, as Mr. Marcy said, truly a half-way measure… Perhaps that which is to come -the abolition of all capture of private property at sea, including the abolition of commercial blockades -is easier than that which has already been accomplished. In international law, as in other things, it is the first step that costs. 39 In other words, it was Professor Stark's view that until such time as all capture of private property at sea was abolished, all countries retained the right to declare which vessels comprised their public navies. However, this expected next step was never taken, at least not in the way he predicted.
International Law
Mercantilism from the 16th to the 18th centuries regarded trade, piracy, and warfare as equals in the field of international competition. As a result, international law, The underlying reasoning for this was a growing recognition of its implications for a nation which was quickly becoming the world leader in maritime commerce. The
Declaration of Paris "codified a fundamental shift in the balance of interests between warfare and trade on the high seas," as globalization tied the economies of all great powers to the success of their commercial enterprises. 43 Thus, if conflict at sea were to continue, "at least it would be reduced to a duel between Governments and their professional fighters." 44 At the end of the 19th Century, Henry Sumner Maine stipulated that,
In a war in which aggression is kept on the old footing by the powers of armament which privateering gives, the Power which had the most property at sea was most injured. The old law took for granted the equality not only of naval strength among states, but in volume of trade and of property risked. To the amount of risk, the amount of loss will always correspond. 45 Thus, at the outset of War with Spain in 1898, President McKinley proclaimed that the U.S. would refrain from privateering, which went a long way to establishing that the principles of the Paris Declaration would apply to the U.S. in future wars. 46 U.S. legal discourse on privateering effectively disappeared from the courts following that war, as modern weapons became too cost-prohibitive for private actors. 47 This lack of legal dialogue on the subject, combined with the vague definition of "privateering" under the Declaration of Paris, and its direct association with letters of marque and reprisal has led to the generally accepted belief that the prohibition against privateering extends to all conceptual aspects of a letter of marque and reprisal. 48 Yet, it's likely that this development was as reflective of politics and power as altruistic reasons.
International law continued to evolve, and subsequently shaped the world's views the laws and customs of war," and that its "…commander must be …commissioned,"
and its "…crew must be subject to military discipline." 51 The intent of this treaty was clearly to place further strict limits on wartime privateering, but whether the intent was to limit the state from redressing wrongs committed during peace via reprisals short of war is indeterminate.
The globalization that was advocated by immunity of world trade from the effects of political strife retreated in the period of the Great Wars, as restraint toward commercial interests finally took a back seat to widespread and violent strife on a global scale. The economic and social impact of war on a globally interdependent world became all too evident in the age of unlimited submarine warfare. The final breakdown of European empires following World War II revived globalization, and eventually led to a new attempt to manage world maritime relations, under the auspices of the United Nations' Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which took place from 1958-1982. 52 While initiated in the interests of the United States following WWII, these contentious conventions have also leveled the playing field for the undeveloped world by attempting to codify in extreme detail the extent of territorial sovereignty over the sea. 53 The establishment of expansive Economic Exclusion Zones (EEZs) under UNCLOS raises significant concerns for major maritime states that treat those zones as "high seas for purposes of war and trade," particularly regarding freedom of navigation. 54 Conversely, the treatment of piracy under UNCLOS and its follow-on, the 1992 Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) has also been thought by some to be further prohibitive of the concept of privateering. In the end, as a powerful maritime state (and even more pointedly, as a global hegemon), the U.S. has found its interests at odds with the full extent of these treaties, and has not fully ratified either. As long as the U.S. has the power to lead the world, its actions are more indicative of the direction in which international law will be developed. According to Moran, In matters of international law, practice trumps theory. Or more precisely, it precedes it, both logically and for the most part historically… The deference of theory to practice… is testimony to its underlying realism and utility [and] suggest[s] that international law is probably not the place to look for leadership in solving the problems of the emergent global economy or in addressing the strategic challenges that have followed in its wake. 55 Which brings us to the present, and the current context of two extraterritorial threats facing the U.S. in the current operational environment.
Maritime Piracy Current Context
According to Oceans Beyond Piracy, a non-profit organization whose work informs the International Maritime Organization, global piracy costs shipping companies, governments, and consumers $7-12 billion per year. 56 Since worldwide maritime commerce accounts for over $12 trillion, this amount may not seem significant, but perception matters, and its impact has a dampening effect, whether slight or amplified, on the world economy. 57 In addition to increased risk and associated operating costs to commercial shippers, high profile incidents attributed to piracy contribute to a general perception that the seas are lawless and cannot be effectively controlled by regional or global forces. As a result, the United States and the international community at large have devoted ever-increasing amounts of time, money, and naval assets to combating maritime piracy.
Although the global resurgence of maritime piracy began in the 1990s, an exponential rise in regional attacks in the waters off Northeast Africa over the last seven years has garnered the attention of the United States and the developed world. 58 Piracy off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden and throughout the Indian Ocean has dominated the headlines as the lion's share of hijacking, hostage taking, and ransoms paid or resulting deaths has occurred in this geographic region. 59 With more than 21,000 ships and up to 12% of the world's petroleum passing through the Gulf of Aden annually, these waters are a critical chokepoint for world commerce, and the vast majority of these attacks have targeted tankers, container ships, and bulk carrierslarge, expensive, and in many cases, hardened targets. 60 
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In 2009, several deeply concerning and widely reported Somali hijackings, as well as a dramatic hostage rescue by a Navy SEAL team brought very high international media profile and increased focus to the multi-national anti-piracy effort. 61 As a result, the greatest percentage of the maritime interdiction effort has focused in this area of the world. At the beginning of 2012, some 30 nations were committing over 40 vessels per day to patrolling the Gulf of Aden and its approaches in the Indian Ocean, at a staggering cost of approximately $100,000 per vessel, per day. 62 By the end of 2011, the total economic cost of Somali piracy was estimated at $5.3 -$5.9 billion, of which approximately $1.3 billion was attributed to the multi-national military effort. 63 The human cost has also been high -even with the decline in piracy, as of 31 December has been the profiteering motive of its land-based activities that has truly sustained and expanded the extent of piracy. 71 In this sense, it also becomes self-sustaining, as the overall economic and social impact of piracy additionally suppresses legitimate (non piracy-based) development. This has been particularly evident in lawless areas such as Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. Therefore, while the pirates themselves may be the weakest link in the chain, a more holistic approach to combating the enterprise as a whole is needed to defeat it. Although international strides in this effort have been made in recent years, to include freezing financier assets and the passage of U.N.
resolutions that allow multi-national military forces to attack pirate infrastructure within Somali territorial waters and on land, the bulk of the effort still comes from naval patrols which target protection of shipping from actual pirates on the high seas. maritime airborne surveillance assets. 74 As the U.S. shifts its economic focus internally, looks for ways to cut defense spending, and "rebalances" its military forces to the Pacific, sustaining the anti-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden and other areas will become even more difficult. This is where a new approach could present opportunities. The next section will look at the threat of cyber exploitation, making parallels between it and maritime piracy, and the final section will suggest a modern letter of marque regime that could be applied to both.
Cyber Exploitation Current Context
Just as the majority of the world's traded goods travel by water, the majority of the world's financial trade is exchanged today via international cyber networks. Even beyond the financial markets themselves, originating sales of goods is becoming ever more internet-driven. Developed largely absent of government controls, the global Cybersecurity threats represent one of the most serious national security, public safety, and economic challenges we face as a nation. The very technologies that empower us to lead also empower those who would disrupt and destroy. They enable our military superiority, but our 20 unclassified government networks are constantly probed by intruders. Our daily lives and public safety depend on power and electric grids, but potential adversaries could use cyber vulnerabilities to disrupt them on a massive scale. The Internet and e-commerce are keys to our economic competitiveness, but cyber criminals have cost companies and consumers hundreds of millions of dollars and valuable intellectual property. 79 The National Security Strategy continues by offering two general ways to "deter, prevent, detect, defend against, and quickly recover from" such cyber intrusions: 1.)
"Investing in People and Technology" to create resilience and personal awareness, and 2.) "Strengthening Partnerships" with industry and international organizations to develop acceptable norms, laws, and responses to address cyber incidents. 80 Surprisingly however, Congress has passed very little legislation regarding cyberspace regulation to date, and U.S. policymakers continue their struggle to appropriately match ways and means to the ends stated in the National Security Strategy. One reason for this is the complexity of cyberspace, while another stems from the fact that its borderless medium blurs distinctions between government and private targets. 81 Federal laws currently in place are designed to protect all computer systems from unauthorized access, and as a result, prohibit private companies attacked from retaliation or even "tracing back" to the originator. 82 While the NSA likely has the capability and authority to take such actions, their involvement in most private sector cases would further blur military-civilian roles and likely violate the Posse Comitatus Act in the case of domestic issues. 83 But the most glaring deficiency is the lack of a conceptual framework with which to look at the growing convergence of interstate and commercial rivalry that is developing in this new domain. Much of the current national security and military network discussion compares the dynamics of cyber security and its development within international relations, particularly as regards China, to the nuclear cold war standoff between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 84 As such, it generally seeks to apply territorial rules and conventions regarding the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) from the physical world to a man-made domain of technological communication and commerce. As a result, many of today's cybersecurity debates promise adversarial threat inflation, future 'cyber arms' races, and resultant doomsday hysteria. While this may well develop in the public arena, the danger of financial crime and commercial espionage is largely being ignored, despite the fact that it is the more imminent issue of national security and economic prosperity, particularly in light of current U.S. economic woes. As one recent article aptly put it, "While would-be Cold Warriors stare at the sky and wait for it to fall, they're getting their wallets stolen and their offices robbed." 85 As lawlessness characterized early activity on the high seas, the same can be said of today's cyber domain. Maritime privateers were held only marginally liable for their misdeeds; the same can be said of modern cyber profiteers and hacktivists, whether state-sponsored or not.
The broad picture that emerges is one of competition interacting within traditional interstate relations, but within the cyber domain. 86 Much as in the maritime environment, those states most skilled at harnessing the cyber domain for social and economic gain are also those most exposed to the dangers lurking within it. 87 Looking then at piracy, terrorism, and cyber threats from their entrepreneurial convergence in the global common of cyberspace could generate interest in using the free enterprise system as a method to help deal with them. companies to maintain dominance in the cyber domain until such time that the U.S. has a sufficient "Cyber Force" that can dominate the high seas of that domain.
In his 1998 fictional novel, Balance of Power, author James Huston examines the idea of using a modern day letter of marque. 88 The book's central theme centers on a terrorist confrontation at sea in which an American merchant ship is sunk and its crew is International Strategy for Cyberspace. 91 Unfortunately, the Budapest Convention imposes an evidentiary standard requiring proof of attribution beyond a reasonable doubt. 92 Under this criminal law approach, no responsive action may be taken without that level of attribution, which is jurisdictionally prohibitive, difficult to prove, and therefore does not sufficiently deter cyber attacks or exploitation. This leaves cyber pirates with a similar risk-reward calculation that perpetuates modern maritime piracy.
In establishing such a system, Hopkins' recommends that Congress limit responses to three levels, grouped according to action authorized under differing standards of evidence ranging from showing probable cause, to demonstrating a preponderance of evidence, to requiring beyond a reasonable doubt. The full extent of the legal concepts behind his proposal is beyond the scope of this paper and its author, The role of the Federal government, then, would be to provide the legal framework for the private sector not only to secure itself against cyber attack and exploitation, but also to take retaliatory or recompensatory action in its event. The overarching policy reasoning for creating such a system would be to more effectively deter would-be criminals from taking such exploitation action in the first place, as much as to punish them and to compensate those who suffer from their actions.
Any agency tasked with regulating and controlling such a system would have to be sensitive to proprietary confidentiality concerns, impose appropriate licensing and bonding requirements, implement regulations and codes of conduct, and maintain a registry database of malicious code for research. 95 By leveraging private sector talent and maintaining separation from the state through the sanction of cyberteers acting 26 under the law, the U.S. could protect its economic interests while helping defuse actions that might otherwise lead to international conflict. 96 Dismantling Cyber Havens
Another recommendation that follows from the study of history can be seen in the systematic dismantling of pirate havens during the Golden Age of piracy. The British government used its naval forces, and at times those of privateers, to dismantle piratefriendly markets. Similar efforts could be taken under such a regime to dismantle their modern day equivalents. It is estimated that as few as 50 Internet Service Providers account for 50% of infected machines worldwide, and according to research presented at the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, a mere three firms process 95% of credit card transactions resulting from phony drug advertising scams. 97 These modernday cyber piracy havens are generally known, and should be targeted to minimize cybercrime.
Building Treaties or Norms
As the period of maritime privateering advanced, a network of bilateral and multilateral agreements was gradually established to assert the principle of open sea commerce, setting the path for global understanding "that eventually turned pirates from accepted actors into international pariahs, pursued by all the world's major powers." 108 As commercial revenue growth and a general vacuum of governmental regulation continue feeding the PMSC counter-piracy boom, the necessity of regulating the actions of these forces should be addressed within an international venue. 109 As national naval forces become resource-limited, perhaps the idea of an internationally-recognized letter of marque regime could serve as the starting point. While the increasing cyber threats are intimidating and have received widespread media coverage and increased focus at the national level, the U.S. is probably still considered a relatively powerful cyber-faring nation. As such, it is questionable whether the U.S. should seek to implicitly encourage cyberteering, when it arguably has the most powerful governmental capabilities or is willing to spend the capital to develop them. In fact, in light of the history covered above, it may even be more likely that we would take the position that the great seafaring powers of the mid-nineteenth century took in establishing the Paris Declaration --seeking thereby to limit the abilities of others to profit by cyberteering at our expense.
Conclusion 31
Evidence of the Framers' intent to create a strong national government can be seen in the Constitution's provisions, as well as its preamble, which states that it was established to "provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty." 111 The fact that the Congress' power to grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal has never been revoked, despite international treaties against privateering, should be considered indicative of the nation's collective desire to ensure that the United States remains adaptive to developments in the global environment and the ever-changing international relations framework. The Framers understood that the U.S. must always have a means to protect itself against foreign threats and ensure economic vitality if it is to remain the guarantor of American freedom and prosperity.
As the U.S. and the international community contemplate a host of difficult security concerns modern extraterritorial threats such as piracy, terrorism, and cyber exploitation, U.S. policymakers and legal scholars should contemplate the conceptual merit of letters of marque and reprisal as a means of combating these threats short of "war." This is not to say that the Constitutional power to grant letters of marque and reprisal should be taken lightly. As Thomas Jefferson explained, "The making of a reprisal on a nation is a very serious thing. Remonstrance and refusal of satisfaction ought to precede; and when reprisal follows, it is considered an act of war, and never yet failed to produce it in the case of a nation able to make war." 112 For this reason, any Department tasked with governing such power granted by Congress must be given the requisite power to properly regulate its use.
At her Senate confirmation hearing in 2009, Secretary of State Clinton stated that "the President-elect and I believe that foreign policy must be based on a marriage of principles and pragmatism, not rigid ideology." She further emphasized the use of "smart power," and defining it as "using the full range of tools at our disposaldiplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural -picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation." 113 While her intent was likely to highlight the need for diplomacy, this balanced approach that seeks to minimize the use of military power to solve state and non-state threats has been sorely lacking in recent years.
Resurrecting well-regulated letters of marque and reprisal, not for war "profiteering," but for effective use of the strength of American entrepreneurial ingenuity, could be seen as one more tool in this holistic approach. The United States' center of gravity is our economic strength and vitality. In order to protect it from the ever-expanding tensions within the cyber domain, and current ambiguity of international law regarding it, perhaps the most convincing application of the letter of marque and reprisal's potential is in this arena.
In the recent words of our new Secretary of State, "More than ever, foreign policy is economic policy." 
